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INTRODUCTION
The legal services market is changing. This change has been driven by
various factors through the years: expansion of in-house legal departments, globalization (through mergers and outsourcing), technological advances, and the rise of alternative legal service providers. This paper
explores these factors in isolation—i.e., discussing each factor separately
and distinctly from other factors. Then, this paper seeks to understand
these factors together, as products of a legal services market that is evolving from the growth stage into the mature stage.
Part I summarizes the early history of law firms, including the rise of
the Cravath System through the Golden Era of the 1960s. Part II examines several factors affecting the legal services market, specifically: expansion of in-house legal departments, globalization (through mergers and
outsourcing), technological advances, and the rise of alternative legal service providers. Finally, Part III discusses how these factors can also be
understood together, as products of a maturing legal services market.
* J.D. Candidate, December 2016, University of Michigan Law School; B.S.,
December 2011, Finance, Accounting, Indiana University. A special thanks to Professor
Robert Hirshon, Frank G. Millard Professor from Practice and Special Counsel on
Developments in the Legal Profession. I was a student in Professor Hirshon’s course that
covered the evolution of law firms, and it was during that course where this paper originated.
Since then, Professor Hirshon has graciously volunteered to provide helpful comments on
this Note and insights into the legal services industry. All opinions and errors are my own.
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DISCUSSION
I. EARLY HISTORY

OF

LAW FIRMS

The early history of law firms began with the emergence of large law
firms in the late nineteenth century. These law firms rapidly expanded to
serve the needs of growing businesses into the 1960s, which is often
termed the Golden Era.
A. Emergence of Large Law Firms
Large law firms emerged in the late nineteenth century.1 Unlike today, the term “large law firm” was initially understood to represent a firm
with four or more lawyers.2 These firms emerged to serve the needs of
growing businesses that required increasingly specialized legal services in
business law and transactional work.3 In 1872, there were only 15 firms
with 4 or more lawyers in the firm. By 1903, that number had grown to
210, and in 1924 it had grown to over 1,000.4
During the first decade of the twentieth century, the “Cravath System”
was established and firms took their modern form.5 Named for Paul
Cravath, a partner at Cravath, Swaine & Moore,6 the Cravath System was
a pyramid-shaped organizational structure in which each partner was
served by several associates to ensure profit maximization.7 Within this
system, there were only two primary classes of professionals: partners and
partnership-track associates.8 Smart, ambitious young lawyers entered the
firm as partnership-track associates.9 These young lawyers underwent a
probationary period, during which partners decided whether the associate
should be admitted as a partner or would be asked to leave the firm.10
Partners were primarily selected from within the firm and hiring an attorney from another firm—termed “lateral hiring”—was rare.11
1. Eli Wald, Smart Growth: The Large Law Firm in the Twenty-First Century, 80
Fordham L. Rev. 2867, 2869 (2012).
2. Vincent Robert Johnson, On Shared Human Capital, Promotion Tournaments, and
Exponential Law Firm Growth, 70 Tex. L. Rev. 537, 542 (1991) (reviewing Marc Galanter &
Thomas Palay, TOURNAMENT OF LAWYERS: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE BIG LAW FIRM
(1991)).
3. Wald, supra note 1, at 2869.
4. MARC GALANTER & THOMAS PALAY, TOURNAMENT OF LAWYERS: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE BIG LAW FIRM 14-15 (1991) (citing data compiled from WAYNE K. HOBSON, THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION AND THE ORGANIZATIONAL SOCIETY, 1890-190
161, 168, and 171 (1986)).
5. Id.
6. Wald, supra note 1, at 2868-69.
7. Id. at 2870.
8. Bernard A. Burk & David McGowan, Big but Brittle: Economic Perspectives on
the Future of the Law Firm in the New Economy, 2011 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 10 (2011).
9. GALANTER & PALAY, supra note 4, at 9.
10. Id. at 28 (referred to as the “up-or-out” rule).
11. Burk & McGowan, supra note 8, at 10.
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In addition to being a time of growth in the legal services market, this
period also marked a shift from lawyers as courtroom advocates, to business advisors.12 In describing this shift, Robert Swaine concluded around
1900 that “the great corporate lawyers of the day drew their reputations
more from their abilities in the conference room and facility in drafting
documents than from their persuasiveness before the courts.”13
B. Pinnacle of Large Law Firms: “Golden Era”
Beginning in the late 1950s and lasting through the early 1960s, law
firms experienced the “Golden Era.”14 For large firms, this was “a time of
prosperity, stable relations with clients, steady but manageable growth,
and a comfortable assumption that this kind of law practice was a permanent fixture of American life.”15 During this time, law firms developed
deep and enduring relationships with corporate clients.16 Often, firms enjoyed direct communication with corporate executives as their trusted advisors.17 Through the 1960s, it was not unusual for a single law firm to
handle all of the legal matters of its major clients.18
The primary driver of these close, institutional relationships was information asymmetry between businesses and their lawyers.19 Starting with
New Deal legislation in the 1930s through the “rights revolution” of the
1960s, the laws governing corporate conduct became increasingly complex.20 Few businesses at the time had the internal expertise to navigate
these regulations.21 Accordingly, businesses invested in close, long-term
relationships with full-service firms to help them understand their legal
responsibilities.22 These close, long-term relationships did not last forever.
II. FACTORS AFFECTING

THE

LEGAL SERVICES MARKET

Since the Golden Era, several factors have forced the legal services
market to change. These factors have taken various forms through the
years, including: expansion of in-house legal departments, globalization,
technological advances, and the rise of alternative legal service providers.
12. GALANTER & PALAY, supra note 4, at 6.
13. Id. at 6 (Mr. Swain, partner at Cravath, chronicled the history of Cravath in ROBERT T. SWAIN, THE CRAVATH FIRM AND ITS PREDECESSORS 1819-1947: THE PREDECESSOR
FIRMS 1819-1906 (1946)).
14. Id. at 20.
15. Id. at 36.
16. See David B. Wilkins, Team of Rivals? Toward A New Model of the Corporate
Attorney-Client Relationship, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2067, 2077 (2010).
17. Craig B. Glidden, The Evolution and Influence of Corporate Legal Departments, 12
FLA. ST. U. BUS. REV. 131, 133-34 (2013).
18. Wilkins, supra note 16, at 2077.
19. Id. at 2077-78.
20. Id. at 2077.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 2078.
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Each of these factors are examined below, concluding with a discussion on
the impact of the Financial Crisis.
A. Rise of In-House Legal Departments
After the Golden Era, many large U.S. corporations expanded the nature and scope of their business activities, especially during the mergers
and acquisitions boom of the 1980s.23 This resulted in more legal work,
including transactions that were larger, more complex, and time-sensitive.24 By the middle of the 1980s, it had simply become too expensive for
businesses to rely exclusively on law firms, especially for reoccurring and
routine work.25 Accordingly, businesses looked to innovate and cut these
legal costs.26 General Electric Co.’s (“GE”) general counsel Ben Heineman led the way, setting the stage for a new approach to delivering legal
services.27
In 1987, Jack Welch, GE’s fabled CEO, charged Heineman with the
task of creating a legal department that rivaled the best law firms at that
time.28 Welch also asked Heineman to seek out and eliminate unnecessary legal costs.29 To Heineman, this meant breaking up long-standing relationships that GE’s business departments had with law firms.30
Accordingly, Heineman recruited and hired exceptional lawyers from
prestigious law firms to work in GE’s legal department.31 By the time
Heineman ended his tenure as General Counsel in 2006, GE employed
over 1,000 in-house attorneys.32
As a result of Heineman’s reign, GE’s legal department began to service much of the work that had previously been sent to law firms.33 In
addition to in-sourcing, GE also controlled the overall management of its
legal work: unbundling it, sourcing it, pricing it, and overseeing the entire
process.34 The bright, experienced lawyers that filled GE’s legal department helped eliminate the information asymmetry between GE and their
outside counsel; which had previously supported the close, long-term rela23. Bruce E. Aronson, Elite Law Firm Mergers and Reputational Competition: Is Bigger Really Better? An International Comparison, 40 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 763, 770 (2007).
24. Id.
25. Glidden, supra note 17, at 134.
26. Id.
27. See generally, Glidden, supra note 17.
28. Id. at 135. Ben Heineman was a “marquis selection.” He was a graduate of
Harvard and Yale, a Rhodes Scholar, a Supreme Court clerk, and the managing partner of
Sidley & Austin’s Washington office. Id.
29. Wilkins, supra note 16, at 2081.
30. Id. at 2081.
31. Id.
32. Id. In 2006, the 1,000 plus lawyers at GE were enough to rank it among the twenty
largest law firms in the world. Id.
33. Id. at 2081-82.
34. Id. at 2082.
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tionships that businesses and their outside counsel had shared in the
Golden Era.35
Because of Heineman’s success, other businesses began to emulate
GE’s policies.36 The traditional relationship that once symbolized the
Golden Era broke down.37 Unlike the Golden Era, where businesses relied on law firms to serve as trusted advisors, businesses began hiring law
firms primarily for specific, specialty tasks that could not be completed inhouse.38 Moreover, businesses ceased relying on just one law firm to service their legal work; instead, businesses split their legal work amongst a
variety of firms.39
Law firms, consequently, were forced to compete regularly for new
matters. These competitions took the form of beauty contests,40 fee reductions, demonstrations of expertise, and consents to demanding supervision.41 The Golden Era was nothing but a faded memory when, in 2003,
GE began requiring firms to compete in online auctions for the company’s
legal work.42
In addition to building in-house legal departments, businesses increasingly turned to consulting firms to help reduce legal costs.43 Specifically,
consulting firms advised corporations on how to save money and increase
productivity by, for example, holding law firms accountable for compliance and billing guidelines.44 Consulting firms such as Altman Weil,
Hildebrandt, and Huron Consulting emerged and focused specifically on
the legal services market and facilitating the transition towards more client-centric services.45
The trend of growing in-house legal departments exerting increased
pressure on law firms has continued.46 Businesses are under pressure to
deliver more for less. This pressure, in turn, has forced businesses to de35. Larry E. Ribstein, The Death of Big Law, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 749, 761 (2010). See
also Wilkins, supra note 16, at 2077.
36.

Wilkins, supra note 16, at 2081.

37.

Id. at 2082.

38.

Abram Chayes & Antonia H. Chayes, Corporate Counsel and the Elite Law Firm,
37 STAN. L. REV. 277, 294 (1985).
39.

Id.

40. Aronson, supra note 23, at 770 n.11 (“ ‘Beauty contest’ generally refers to the process by which a corporate client establishes a competitive procedure to select outside
counsel.”).
41.

Wilkins, supra note 16, at 2082.

42.

Id. at 2082.

43.

Glidden, supra note 17, at 136.

44.

Id.

45. See id; Heather D. Jefferson, Marketing the 21st Century Law Firm, DEL. LAW.,
Spring 2001, at 6.
46. Eversheds, Law Firm of the 21st Century: The Clients’ Revolution, 2 (2010), https://
www.law.georgetown.edu/academics/centers-institutes/legal-profession/documents/upload/
Conference-Papers-Add-Material-ClientRevolution.pdf.
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mand that their law firms reduce costs and provide greater value.47 Law
firm managing partners and chairs in U.S. firms expressed these sentiments in the Altman Weil 2015 Survey.48 In that survey, 72% of law firms
stated that they believed the pace of change in the profession was increasing.49 Additionally, law firm leaders found that clients were taking matters into their own hands by using “alternative measures themselves to
achieve greater efficiency and economy.”50 Accordingly, 67% of law firms
stated that they were losing business to in-house legal departments that
were in-sourcing work.51
B. Globalization: Mergers and Outsourcing
In the late nineteenth century, law firms expanded in response to the
needs of growing businesses.52 Today, law firms engage in mergers and
outsourcing in response to the growing global legal services market.53
1. Mergers
The trend of law firm mergers, beginning in the mid-1990s,54 has dramatically increased during the past few years.55 In 2015, there were 91 law
firm mergers and acquisitions: a record high that included the largest law
firm merger ever.56
In 2015, multinational law firm Dentons announced its merger with
Chinese law firm Dacheng—firms of 2,500 and 3,500 lawyers, respectively.57 Moreover, this was only the first of eight mergers for Dentons
during 2015: other notable combinations occurred with Australian firm
Gadens, which had 500 lawyers; United States firm McKenna Long & Aldridge, with 300 lawyers; and Singapore firm Rodyk, with 200 lawyers.58
Dentons continued this growth strategy into 2016, expanding into the Car47.

Id.

48. See generally, Thomas S. Clay & Eric A. Seeger, Law Firms in Transition: An Altman Weil Flash Survey, ALTMAN WEIL (2015), http://www.altmanweil.com/dir_docs/resource/
95e9df8e-9551-49da-9e25-2cd868319447_document.pdf.
49.

Id. at ii.

50.

Id.

51.

Id at 20.

52.

See Wald, supra note 2, at 2869.

53.

Aronson, supra note 23, at 770.

54.

Id. at 769-70.

55. Elizabeth Olson, Law Firm Mergers Rose Again Last Year, N.Y. TIMES, (Jan. 7,
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/08/business/dealbook/law-firm-mergers-rose-againlast-year.html?_r=0.
56.

Id.

57.

Id.

58.

Id.
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ibbean and Latin America.59 As of December 2016, Dentons housed
around 7,500 lawyers—the world’s largest law firm by number of lawyers—and rumors swirl of more mergers to come (e.g., merger with the
European arm of King & Wood Mallesons).60
Law firms and legal consultants offer a number of justifications for
these mergers. For example, Altman Weil, a leading legal consulting company, suggests the following reasons for growth through merger activity:
• to serve existing clients that have a growing business;
• to serve new clients that have been acquired through beauty contests or
referred to a law firm by its existing clients;
• to add practice areas that are needed by clients; or
• to access new geographical markets.61

Some observers of the law firm merger phenomenon are skeptical.
Bruce Aronson spent eleven years as a partner at a major New York law
firm before becoming a law professor at Creighton University.62 Professor
Aronson argues that mergers are the result of reputational signaling and
herd behavior.63 Professor Aronson contends that law firms have become
desperate to demonstrate their reputation and quality to clients in the current legal services market—which is marked by increased competition
forcing firms to compete largely on the basis of reputation because quality
is too difficult to measure and quantify.64 Professor Aronson believes this
is especially prevalent given the current uncertainty around the legal services market: general uncertainty about the legal services market and specific uncertainty around the drivers of merger activity.65 Under these
conditions, law firms, he claims, are more likely to engage in defensive
mergers based solely on the actions of other firms—e.g., law firm A
merges, so law firm B believes that it should also merge because law firm
B is uncertain about the future of the legal services industry and does not
have complete information on why law firm A merged.66 Finally, Professor Aronson claims that the behavior of elite firms—such as Wachtell and
Cravath—support his understanding of merger activity. These elite firms
do not have the same reputational and quality concerns. Accordingly, their
current behavior—pursuing a clear strategy of high-profitability over increased merger activity—is logical.67 In contrast to Professor Aronson’s
59. Katie Walsh, Dentons Extends Footprint to Sydney at Last, Gadens Split, FINANREVIEW, (Dec. 1, 2016), http://www.afr.com/business/legal/dentons-extends-footprintto-sydney-at-last-gadens-split-20161129-gt0g1l#.
60. Id.
61. Ward Bower, A Growing Problem?, ALTMAN WEIL, 1-2 (2014), http://
www.altmanweil.com//dir_docs/resource/338ca46f-0bc8-4237-b9140b2d35662d8b_document.pdf.
62. Aronson, supra note 23, at 763.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 763, 767.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 830.
CIAL
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assertion, however, it is worth noting that other elite firms—such as Skadden and Jones Day—have expanded globally through mergers and acquisitions without evidence of a dire need to demonstrate reputational
excellence to clients.
Regardless of the drivers of merger activity, most observers warn
against unjustified incentives for growth.68 Altman Weil in particular,
concludes their analysis by emphasizing the need for careful, strategic
planning for law firms involved in mergers and warns against the herd
approach of “bigger is always better.”69
The strategic implications of Dentons’ recent combinations have already triggered the concern of some consultants. For example, Dentons’
business is organized as a swiss verein, which is an association of independent legal entities—e.g., Dentons Europe, Dentons US, etc. Accordingly,
Mr. Bower, an Altman Weil principal, warned that “it will be challenging
for [Dentons] to create and maintain a unified vision and mission for their
brand.”70 These strategic implications should be a concern for more than
merely consultants. Several law firm mergers have failed to live up to expectations because of a lack of strategic vision, leaving behind a trail of
firms that no longer exist.
A highly touted 2008 merger between Dewey Ballantine and LeBoeuf,
Lamb, Greene & MacRae produced a 1,300 lawyer firm, under the name
of Dewey & LeBoeuf LLP.71 Four short years later, however, that firm
sought bankruptcy protection, which marked the largest U.S. law firm failure in history.72 Although the motivations and drivers of the current wave
of law firm mergers vary, it is evident that these combinations are drastically changing the landscape of the legal profession.
2. Outsourcing
In addition to increased merger activity, law firms have also responded
to the global legal services market by outsourcing legal work to countries
that have relatively low labor costs, such as India.73 The advantages of
outsourcing are simple: reduced costs and added value by allowing U.S.
law firms to focus on the sophisticated legal needs of their clients.74 The
increase in outsourcing activity has, consequently, led to businesses that
focus primarily on outsourcing and advise clients on outsourcing matters—
these businesses are discussed in more detail in the Alternative Legal Service Providers section.75
68. Bower, supra note 61, at 2.
69. Id at 4.
70. Olson, supra note 55.
71. Jennifer Smith, A Tough Case for Law Firm Mergers, WALL ST. J., Apr. 13, 2014.
72. Id.
73. See Ribstein, supra note 35, at 766.
74. See Carlo D’Angelo, Overseas Legal Outsourcing and the American Legal Profession: Friend or “Flattener”?, 14 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 167, 172 (2008).
75. See Ribstein, supra note 35, at 766.
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C. Technology
Technology has also been a driver of change in the legal services market.76 Just as process engineering and automation revolutionized blue-collar industries, computing power is revolutionizing white-collar industries.77
Legal services, like other white-collar industries, has a notable subset of
tasks that are subject to automation.78 Law firms, faced with increased
pressure from businesses to do more with less, have increasingly turned to
technology to either automate or semi-automate tasks previously performed by lawyers.79 For example, e-discovery and predictive coding have
already substantially affected the legal services market; and an even
greater technology—quantitative legal prediction—awaits on the
horizon.80
The term e-discovery refers to software that can efficiently analyze
documents, typically used in the discovery stage of litigation, at a fraction
of the time lawyers would otherwise spend.81 Traditionally, this software
has identified targeted terms at very efficient speeds.82 The modern generation of e-discovery, however, is much more expansive. This next generation, termed predictive coding, refers to a computer program that uses
algorithms to identify relevant documents.83 Specifically, lawyers upload
documents into the program and then manually review a batch of those
documents to train the program how to recognize terms that are relevant.84 This manual review is then repeated until the program has developed a model that accurately predicts relevant documents.85 Research has
shown that predictive coding outperforms human reviewers because it is
more precise—i.e., predictive coding flags fewer irrelevant documents
than human reviewers—although by how much is unclear.86
Now, an even more sophisticated technology is poised to cause further
disruption—quantitative legal prediction. Quantitative legal prediction
refers to a process that predicts legal outcomes based on the quantitative
76. See Daniel Martin Katz, Quantitative Legal Prediction—or—How I Learned to
Stop Worrying and Start Preparing for the Data-Driven Future of the Legal Services Industry,
62 EMORY L.J. 909, 909 (2013).
77. Id. at 913–14 (citing STANLEY ARONOWITZ & WILLIAM DIFAZIO, THE JOBLESS
FUTURE (2d ed. 2010)).
78.

Id. at 910.

79.

Id.

80.

Id. at 911–12.

81. John Markoff, Armies of Expensive Lawyers, Replaced by Cheaper Software, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 5, 2011, at A1.
82.

Id.

83. Katz, supra note 77 at 945; Joe Palazzolo, Why Hire a Lawyer? Computers Are
Cheaper, WALL ST. J., June 18, 2012, at B1.
84.

Id..

85.

Id.

86.

Id.
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analysis of data points.87 This approach has emerged at the intersection of
three central technological advances.88 First, the transistor count of the
world’s leading central processing unit (used to measure the speed of computers) has historically doubled every twelve to eighteen months.89 Second, the decreasing cost of data storage has followed a similar, if not more
extreme, trend as the transistor count—i.e., storage costs are decreasing by
half, or more, every twelve to eighteen months.90 And lastly, soft artificial
intelligence has arrived.91 Soft artificial intelligence denotes that, although human results can be obtained using this technology, the underlying intellectual process of humans has not yet been attained (nor is it very
well understood).92
The underlying process of quantitative legal prediction is especially
pertinent in the legal services market because it helps to overcome some
of the limitations of human reasoning.93 For example, humans are limited
by the scope of their observations—e.g., an experienced lawyer may remember hundreds or thousands of data points, such as cases, holdings, and
settlements.94 In contrast, quantitative legal prediction can be based on
tens of thousands, or hundreds of thousands of data points.95 In addition
to limited scope, humans have well-documented cognitive biases: availability heuristic, optimism bias, anchoring, confirmation bias, illusion of validity, and frequency illusion.96 In contrast, quantitative legal prediction
does not have innate cognitive biases so some of the human biases are
eliminated.97
From a broad social perspective, incorporating technology into legal
services can be seen as beneficial because it lowers the cost for clients.98
From a law firm’s perspective, however, technology typically lowers revenue and eliminates jobs.99 For example, previously, law firms were able to
bill their associates’ time spent on document review, which can be very
time intensive.100 Now, however, “it means that a lot of people who used
to be allocated to conduct document review are no longer able to be billed
87. See generally Katz, supra note 77.
88. Id. at 913–19.
89. Id. at 914.
90. Id. at 916.
91. Id. at 918.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 928–29.
94. Id. at 928.
95. Id..
96. Id. at 929.
97. Id.
98. William D. Henderson & Rachel Zahorsky, Law Job Stagnation May Have Started
Before the Recession – And It May be a Sign of Lasting Change, ABA J. (Jul. 1, 2011), http://
www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/paradigm_shift.
99. See generally, id.
100. See Markoff, supra note 82.
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out,” said Bill Herr, who managed massive document review projects as a
lawyer at a major chemical company.101
Although technology does create new jobs, that does not necessarily
mean that the number of jobs created by technology equals or exceeds the
jobs eliminated by technology; nor does it guarantee the jobs created are
equal or better opportunities in pay and responsibility.102 David Autor, an
economics professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, asserts
that the U.S. economy is being “hollowed out” by technology.103 Jobs in
the middle are being lost to automation and outsourcing, while the new
jobs being added are coming at the bottom of the economic pyramid.104
Moreover, job growth at the top is slowing because of automation.105
Regardless of where experts stand on the advantages and disadvantages of technology, it is clear that technology has already disrupted the
traditional law firm model and newer technology, such as quantitative legal prediction, is set to disrupt that model even further.
D. Alternative Legal Service Providers
Businesses are increasingly turning to alternatives to traditional law
firms. Just as businesses expanded their in-house legal departments in response to the rising costs of legal services, such as GE did in the 1980s,
today’s corporations are again searching for alternatives.106 Businesses
other than law firms—termed “alternative legal service providers”—have
turned to technology and process management to compete with law
firms.107 Although each of these providers are unique, they share several
common aspects.108 Specifically, these firms seek to: (1) reduce costs, especially overhead; (2) offer alternative billing practices—something other
than the billable hour; (3) provide alternative practices for lawyer compensation and tenure; and (4) find innovative solutions to the process and
delivery of legal services.109
Axiom, a Delaware corporation, is a leading provider of tech-enabled
legal services; and a paradigm of alternative legal service providers.110
Axiom operates with over 1,500 employees across three continents.111
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. See John S. Dzienkowski, The Future of Big Law: Alternative Legal Service Providers to Corporate Clients, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2995, 2996 (2014).
107. See generally, id.
108. See id. at 3002-15 (providing an overview of the leading alternative legal services
providers, including Clearspire, VLP Law Group, Axiom, and Paragon).
109. Id. at 3002.
110. Id. at 3008.
111. What We Do, AXIOM, http://www.axiomlaw.com/what-we-do/ (last visited Feb. 12,
2017).
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Axiom’s mission is to improve legal services by effectively combining law
with business and technology.112 An example of this innovation is Axiom’s own proprietary software, Iris, that seamlessly combines its attorney
teams with business operations and management personnel to collaborate
more efficiently with in-house legal departments.113 In addition to using
technology, Axiom also reduces its overhead by encouraging their attorneys to work from the client site, from home, or even from other law
firms.114
Companies have bought into this approach. Axiom has ongoing relationships with almost half of the Fortune 100 companies.115 Recently, Axiom signed a $73 million contract with an undisclosed global bank.116 The
bank hired Axiom to process the bank’s master trading agreements to
maintain the bank’s compliance with capital and other regulations.117 This
contract work is intended to allow the bank to manage its exposure to
risks of default in the mortgage industry from swaps, derivatives, and
other securities.118 This deal drew the interest of Mary Schapiro, former
chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission, who believes that
agreements like this will help businesses better understand their exposure.119 This was a major concern for her and other drafters of the DoddFrank Act.120
Virtual Law Partners (also referred to as “VLP”) is another alternative
to Big Law.121 VLP is based on a model where only senior lawyers and
highly trained paralegals, provide legal services for clients.122 The model
is based on the idea that experienced lawyers provide the most value and
the less complex work can be outsourced to other law firms or legal service providers.123 Great autonomy is granted to VLP’s lawyers. Each
partner has authority to establish their own fee structure and, if necessary,
billing rates with clients.124 The underlying rationale is that each partner
is in the best position to know how, and what, to charge the client.125 Ad112.
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ditionally, VLP’s lawyers are compensated based on a fixed percentage of
partner billings.126
Unbundling and efficiency are at the essence of alternative legal service providers.127 As opposed to Big Law, which traditionally serves as a
one-stop-shop for a business’s legal needs, alternative legal service providers recognize that each legal matter can be analyzed and effectively unbundled.128 The purpose of unbundling is to ensure the most efficient and
competent person services each discrete task.129 For example, a client’s
project may be divided into legal work and nonlegal work. Legal work is
then further unbundled into categories based on whether it is complex
high-risk work or more mundane low-risk work.130 Although each alternative legal service provider has unique aspects, all of these businesses
offer an attractive alternative to Big Law, implementing technology and
process management to fulfill the needs of the modern legal services
market.
E. Financial Crisis
The Financial Crisis, beginning in late 2007, drastically changed the legal services market: thousands of associates were laid off, partners were
de-equitized, companies slashed legal budgets, and hiring practices were
halted or sharply reduced.131 In 2009 alone, over 4,000 lawyers were laid
off.132 Moreover, from the period of 2008 through 2014, over 15,000 lawyers and staff were let go.133 It is undisputed that the recession has had a
major impact on the legal services market.134
Although some commentators credit the economic downturn as the instigator for change in the legal profession, the recession itself is not generally thought to be the primary driver of change.135 Instead, the recession
accelerated other significant, long-term drivers of change—e.g., pressure
from in-house legal departments and technology.136 The Financial Crisis
did, however, provide an opportunity to critically examine long-standing
assumptions about law firms and the clients they serve.137
126.

Id.

127. Id. at 3015.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Henderson & Zahorsky, supra note 99.
132. Samantha Robbins, From Big Law to Legal Education: The Trickle Down Effect of
the Recession, 27 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 841, 844 (2014).
133. Id.
134. Eversheds, supra note 46.
135. See generally Ribstein, supra note 35; Eversheds, supra note 46; see generally
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Employment data supports this conclusion. Data collected by the U.S.
Census Bureau indicates that the surge in law firm employment hit a plateau beginning in 2004.138 From 1998 through 2004, law firm employment
grew by more than 16%, or 169,000 jobs.139 In contrast, between March
2004 and March 2008—several months before the Wall Street meltdown—
the law firm sector had already lost nearly 20,000 jobs.140 “There is no
question that a serious recession caused a heightened sense of awareness
for law firms and consumers,” says Gregory Jordan, Reed Smith’s global
managing partner and chairman of the senior management team and executive committee.141 The long-term trends, however, appeared to have
started before the financial crisis.
III. MATURITY

OF THE

LEGAL SERVICES MARKET

The factors affecting the legal services market, when studied separately, may appear isolated: expansion of in-house legal departments,
globalization (through mergers and outsourcing), technological advances,
and the rise of alternative legal service providers. According to this perspective, each event has a distinct root cause, triggering a specific change
within law firms. For example, the cause of expanding in-house legal departments is attributable to GE’s Jack Welch and Ben Heineman Jr. during the 1980s.142 For another example, the cause of the layoff of over
4,000 big law lawyers in 2009 is attributable to the Financial Crisis, which
began (arguably) in 2008.143
These factors, however, can also be understood from a different perspective: all of these factors are merely products of a maturing legal services market. For example, in recent years, some firms have responded to
market disruption by reducing the number of entry-level associates: turning the traditional pyramid structure of the Cravath System into a diamond model—with the experienced associates and non-equity partners
constituting the wide middle.144 This begs the question: is this diamond
model attributable to one discrete cause—e.g., technology—or is it in response to the maturation of the legal services market generally?

138.

Id.

139.

Id.

140.

Id.

141.

Id.

142.

See Glidden, supra note 17.

143.

See Dzienkowski, supra note 107 at 3006.

144. Henderson & Zahorsky, supra note 90 (noting the short-term needs driving this
pyramid structure are at odds with the long-term needs of investing in a sustainable model
that supports clients demands in the future: not enough lawyers undergoing training).

Spring 2017]

The Business of Law

301

A. Maturing Market
The legal services market has reached a point of maturity.145 Geoffrey
Moore, organizational theorist and management consultant, divides markets into four stages: Growth Stage, Mature Stage, Declining Stage, and
End of Life Stage.146 Initially, the Growth Stage is marked by doubledigit growth rates and healthy profit margins.147 This stage transitions into
the Mature Stage, where the market experiences flat growth and increasing commoditization.148 Then, during the Declining Stage, businesses experience difficulty finding opportunities for attractive returns.149 Finally,
the End of Life Stage is self-explanatory.150
Dating back to at least 1994, leaders within the American legal profession have grappled with indications that the legal services market was entering the Mature Stage.151 In August 1994, the Board of Governors of
the Florida and Texas Bar met in Georgia to hear opening remarks from
the American Bar Association President-elect Roberta Ramo.152 Following President Ramo’s introduction, Ward Bower, president of Altman
Weil Pensa and a nationally recognized management consultant, addressed the assembled leaders with a 40 minute presentation on the maturation of the legal services market, including warnings that: the practice of
law had become a business; the legal services market had displayed characteristics of maturity; and the future could bring about slower growth in
fee revenues, diminished profitability per lawyer, and declines in profit
margins.153 Mr. Bower went on to discuss the characteristics of maturity:
greater level of consumer (client) sophistication, large numbers of supplier
(law firm) consolidations and contractions, supplier (law firm) differentiation and specialization, geographical expansion to find new or underserved
markets, fierce competition based on price, and decreased legal and financial barriers to entry into the profession.154
It appears that the characteristics and warnings regarding the maturation of the legal service market have materialized. The increased level of
client sophistication parallels the rise of in-house corporate legal departments, such as GE, that helped resolve the information asymmetry that
marked the Golden Era. The consolidation and contraction of law firms is
145. Michael Callier & Achim Reeb, The Industrial Age of Law: Operationalizing Legal
Practice Through Process Improvement, 93 OR. L. REV. 853, 854 (2015).
146. Id. at 864 (citing GEOFFREY A. MOORE, DEALING WITH DARWIN: HOW GREAT
COMPANIES INNOVATE AT EVERY PHASE OF THEIR EVOLUTION (2005)).
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evident in the wave of mergers and subsequent failures of law firms—e.g.,
Denton’s merger with Dacheng and Dewey & LeBoeuf’s bankruptcy, respectively. Law firm differentiation, specialization, and fierce competition
based on price is demonstrated on a continuous basis by the ongoing
beauty contests that law firms undergo to bid on companies’ legal work.
The recent wave of mergers also fills the role of geographical expansion
into new or underserved markets.
In addition to firms growing through mergers, alternative legal service
providers, such as LegalZoom, are poised for increased growth in underserved markets.155 Lastly, barriers to entering the legal services market
are deteriorating. For example, in 2007 the Legal Services Act was passed
in the United Kingdom.156 This act created alternative business structures
that allow non-lawyers to hold ownership and management positions in
law firms.157 Moreover, barriers in the U.S. have recently been tested.158
In February of 2016, the ABA adopted Resolution 105, which provides
model regulatory objectives for states considering how to regulate alternative legal service providers.159 Resolution 105 has been attacked by some
as endorsing the practice of law by non-lawyers.160 The resolution was
proposed by the Commission on the Future of Legal Services.161 William
Hubbard, past ABA president, spoke in favor of the resolution and stated
that the ABA was not capable of putting “the internet back in the bottle”
and should instead “stand up and lead.”162
Recently, the financial performance of the legal services market has
provided even further evidence of a maturing market.163 In 2014, two key
performance indicators of law firms, profits per partner (PPP) and revenue per lawyer (RPL), went up by just 0.2% and down by 0.4% over the
155. See Robert Ambrogi, Latest Legal Victory Has Legal Zoom Poised For Growth,
ABA JOURNAL, (Aug.1, 2014 ), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/latest_legal_vic
tory_has_legalzoom_poised_for_growth/ (discussing LegalZoom’s plan of offering fullfledged legal advice to consumers and small businesses, in addition to its initial offering of
legal forms).
156. See generally Sydney M. Cone, III, International Legal Practice Involving England
and New York Following Adoption of the United Kingdom Legal Services Act 2007, 28 NW. J.
INT’L L. & BUS. 415 (2008) (discussing some results of the passage of the United Kingdom
Legal Services Act of 2007).
157. Laura Snyder, Does the UK Know Something We Don’t About Alternative Business
Structures?, ABA J., (Jan. 1 2015), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/
does_the_uk_know_something_we_dont_about_alternative_business_structures.
158. See Lorelei Laird, ABA House Approves Model Regulatory Objective for NonTraditional Legal Services, ABA J. (Feb. 8, 2016) http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/
house_approves_proposed_model_regulatory_objectives_for_nontraditional_lega (noting
that Resolution 105, passed in February 2016, has been attacked by some as endorsing the
practice of law by non-lawyers).
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previous year, respectively, for law firms in the AM Law 100.164 Moreover, from 2008 to 2014, RPL in the Am Law 100 beat inflation by only
0.005%, although PPP beat inflation by 8%.165 This performance is much
weaker than the previous four years: from 2004 to 2007, RPL and PPP
beat inflation by 5% and 24%, respectively.166
B. What’s Next?
A number of authors have discussed this changing market environment.
Richard Susskind addresses the legal services industry directly, stating that
firms will continue to be “driven relentlessly by their clients to reduce
their costs.”167 Accordingly, Susskind recommends that firms embrace
this changing market and continuously seek ways to provide their clients
with better services at a lower cost.168 Although Susskind himself finds
that “most traditional [legal] practices are not changing much,” he predicts
an end to the Cravath pyramid structure.169 Susskind also discusses the
proposition that the “Big 4” accounting firms could come into the legal
services market because they are well positioned to address the dynamic
needs and cost pressures of businesses.170
Clayton Christensen addresses changing markets generally. After
studying numerous markets, Christensen provides a number of principles
intended to help managers in the high tech and low tech manufacturing
and service businesses confront slowly evolving or rapidly changing environments.171 Christensen lists five fundamental principles of organizational nature that managers in successful firms consistently recognize and
harness:
(1) Resource dependence: customers effectively control the patterns of resource allocation in well-run companies.
(2) Small markets do not solve the growth needs of large companies.
(3) The ultimate uses or applications for disruptive technologies are unknowable in advance. Failure is an intrinsic step toward success.
(4) Organizations have capabilities that exist independently of the capabilities
of the people who work within them. Organizations’ capabilities reside in
their processes and their values—and the very processes and values that
constitute their core capabilities within the current business model also
define their disabilities when confronted with disruption.
164.
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(5) Technology supply may not equal market demand. The attributes that
make disruptive technologies unattractive in established markets often
are the very ones that constitute their greatest value in emerging
markets.172

Lastly, it is generally agreed that in a mature environment, process quality and improvement are vital.173 Alternative legal service providers, such
as Axiom, can be understood as directly responsive to providing quality
processes.174
In addition to alternative legal service providers, some observers are
encouraging law firms to implement the DMAIC framework to innovate
and improve on their processes.175 The acronym DMAIC stands for: Define, Measure, Analyze, Improve, and Control.176 DMAIC is utilized for
the process improvement methodology, Six Sigma.177 DMAIC enables
practitioners to “gain clarity about the nature of the problems and their
causes” to improve on fundamental performance dimensions: quality, cost,
and time.178 Although supporters of DMAIC acknowledge the inherent
difficulties in applying the DMAIC framework to law firms—e.g., difficulty in obtaining reliable information on the quality of services law firms
provide—authors have provided solutions to overcome these
difficulties.179
CONCLUSION
Since their inception dating back to the late nineteenth century, large
law firms have constantly evolved. Recently, this evolution has been
driven by factors that have taken various forms: expansion of in-house
legal departments, globalization—through mergers and outsourcing, technological advances, and the rise of alternative legal service providers. The
effects of these factors have rippled throughout the legal services market
around the world.
It is, however, important to keep perspective. The pace of change has
been greatly exaggerated in the past—such as McKinsey & Company famously predicting in the 1990s that Cravath would no longer exist as an
independent firm by the 21st century.180 Obviously, Cravath still exists.
Nevertheless, it appears that the market is currently undergoing a fundamental shift from growth to maturation; bringing about significant changes
to law firms across the globe.
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